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Abstract
We run experiments on English Auctions where the bidders already own a part (toehold) of
the good for sale. The theory predicts a very strong ("explosive") e¤ect of even small toeholds.
While asymmetric toeholds do have an e¤ect on bids and revenues in the lab, which gets stronger
the larger the asymmetry, it is not nearly as strong as predicted. We explain this by analyzing the
atness of the payo¤ functions, which leads to large deviations from the equilibrium strategies
being relatively costless. This is a general fundamental weakness of this type of explosive
equilibria, which makes them fail when human players are involved. Our analysis shows that a
levels of reasoning model explains the results better where this equilibrium fails. Moreover, we
nd that although big toeholds can be e¤ective in a takeover battle, the cost to acquire them
might be higher than the strategic benet they bring.
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1 Introduction
The control of a company or asset typically changes hands several times over its lifetime. For
example, worldwide mergers and acquisitions of companies have exceeded 3 trillion Euros in four
of the last ve years. Auction theory can contribute to the study of some of these transactions.
Competition for the control of a company can be essentially viewed as an ascending auction,
with the various bidders sequentially submitting bids that have to be higher than the previous ones
of their competitors. The bidders in such an auction have more or less similar valuations for the
contested company. This leads to the literature often viewing such takeover battles as common
value auctions. While there is a strong common value element in these auctions there very often
exist small asymmetries which can radically change the strategic interplay between the bidders and
the outcome of the contest.
If the asymmetries are due to some private control benets or idiosyncratic synergies then we can
speak of almost common value auctions (Klemperer 1998), auctions where one of the bidders has
a small payo¤ advantage, a value that is slightly higher than the common value. The asymmetries
can also arise when some bidders already own a part of the company that is being sold. Ownership
of such a part is called a toehold and is quite common in takeover battles (Betton and Eckbo 2000).
This paper presents results from experiments on auctions with toeholds and compares these results
with the theory and other experimental results in almost common value auctions.
In theory ownership of a toehold can deter competitors from bidding for the company and can
give its owner a strong strategic advantage. Bulow et al. (1999) give a good illustration of how
toeholds can be useful in takeover battles. The authors use an English auction framework, where
bidders for a company have similar restructuring plans but di¤ering estimates of the expected
returns. Under this setup, the buyers have common values but imperfect signals. The analysis
proceeds to nd that with common values, toeholds can have a profound e¤ect on players optimal
strategies. Players with a toehold bid more aggressively as they know they will not have to pay the
full price and in the case they lose they will get part of this payment. On the other hand players
facing an opponent who owns a toehold, have to play less aggressively than if the playing eld
were level. In equilibrium, even with a small toehold of 5% or 10% the bidder who owns it will
get the company for a much lower price than without toeholds. Thus, theory gives strong reasons
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for bidders to acquire toeholds. The empirical ndings however are not in full support of this idea.
Betton and Eckbo (2000) nd that only about half of the bidders acquire toeholds before trying to
buy a majority stake.
Our paper addresses the conict between this observation and theoretical results. Although
theory predicts that the toeholds should have a big e¤ect on the players predicted strategies, the
e¤ect could be much smaller when human players participate in this game, for reasons that will
become clear in the analysis. Thus we designed and ran a series of experiments to test this idea. We
choose an English auction with two players and common values, similar to the Bulow et al. (1999)
setup. The major simplication is that we let the total value simply be the sum of the signals the
players receive. This is to keep the setup simple and to avoid understanding problems on behalf
of the players. What we found is indeed that although toeholds give bidders an advantage, it is
not nearly as strong as theory predicts. Thus, under some circumstances it is not advisable for
an agent planning a takeover to acquire toeholds. Moreover, we nd that the players deviation
from the theoretical prediction is not unreasonable, but rather has deep roots in the structure of
the equilibrium proposed by Bulow et al (1999) and all other explosive equilibria of this type. The
equilibrium payo¤ functions are in some cases extremely at, meaning that large deviations from
equilibrium are practically costless. In particular, we nd that when the ratio of the two players
toeholds is larger than 10 (e.g. 1% and 10%), the strong bidder can deviate almost 50% from his
optimal bid with a negligible loss in expected payo¤. Consequently, there is no reason to believe
that human agents  be it in the lab or in real markets  would play their exact best responses.
Thus, convergence to the theoretical equilibrium is very unlikely. We show that a levels-of-reasoning
model (Nagel 1995, Stahl and Wilson 1995, Crawford and Iriberri 2008) which assumes bounded
rationality of the players generates more intuitive predictions and ts the observed behavior more
precisely.
The study of auctions with toeholds does not only apply to company takeovers but also to the
case of regulators selling "stranded assets", banks selling foreclosed properties and other bankruptcy
auctions. Experienced auction experts constitute only a fraction of the bidders in such auctions,
while many bidders are participating for the rst time. Thus, a study of auctions with toeholds in
the laboratory with human subjects can yield results relevant to many real life situations.
To our knowledge there is just one other experimental study focusing on toeholds, recent inde-
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pendent work by Hamaguchi et al. (2007). There also exist a few studies on auctions with almost
common values that as mentioned above lead to similar theoretical results (see for example Kagel
and Levin 2003). When a player is known to enjoy a payo¤ advantage in a common value auction,
theory predicts an explosive e¤ect in the bidding strategies, similarly to the e¤ect of toeholds. The
player with the advantage bids more aggressively, his opponents less, which leads to the strong
player winning almost all the time. Avery and Kagel (1997) have sought to test this theory and
they found that the di¤erences in common values have a linear and not explosive e¤ect. Moreover,
they nd advantaged bidders behavior resembles a best response to the behavior of disadvantaged
bidders. The latter bid much more aggressively than in equilibrium, which leads to negative aver-
age prots. Experienced players bid consistently closer to the Nash equilibrium than inexperienced
bidders, although these adjustments towards equilibrium are small.
In a recent paper with a similar setup, Rose and Kagel (2008) again nd that the Nash prediction
fails to prognose the subjects behavior. They nd rather that behavior is characterized by a
behavioral model where the advantaged bidders simply add their private value to their private
information signal about the common value, and proceed to bid as if in a pure common value
auction. The model they chose is actually, as we shall see later, a special case of the more general
toehold framework. The main theoretical di¤erence between their model and ours is that the high
types should win the auction with probability one in the almost common value setting, while in
our experiments the e¤ect is predicted to be much weaker.
While our paper nds no explosive e¤ect of small asymmetries, similarly to the above papers,
our design has the advantage of varying toehold di¤erences which allow us to see if the comparative
statics predicted by theory hold, even when subjects are not following exactly the equilibrium
strategies. Our nding is that in general weak types tend to bid less aggressively the higher the
toehold di¤erence, which is only partially in accordance with the theory but much more consistent
with the predictions of the levels of reasoning model.
Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents the experimental setup and Section 4 analyzes
the data. Section 5 concludes.
4
2 The model
Two risk neutral bidders i and j bid in an English auction for one unit of an indivisible good.
Bidders signals tk are independently drawn from the uniform distribution in [0,1]. The value of
the good to every bidder is then just the sum of these signals. Additionally the bidders already
own a share of the company k, which we will call a toehold. Ownership of a toehold means that in
case the company is sold the owner will get k times the sale price, thus if she wins she only pays
1  k. Bidders shares are exogenous and common knowledge.
The unique symmetric equilibrium is calculated in Bulow et al. (1999).
Proposition 1 The equilibrium bidding functions of the game are given by
bi(ti) = 2 
1
1+j
(1  ti) 
1
1+j
(1  ti)
i
j
A discussion and the proofs can be found in the aforementioned paper.
The proposition is true for all  > 0: For  = 0 we would have a usual English auction with
common values, with the well known equilibria. That is, in the absence of toeholds the equilibrium
bidding functions would be just symmetric, straight lines1 through the origin with slope 2. Even
when players have toeholds, if they are symmetric, the bidding functions are still symmetric straight
lines with a slope that depends on :
Now, when the toeholds are asymmetric there is the explosive e¤ect described in the introduc-
tion. The bidding functions of the two players grow apart very rapidly. In Figure 1 you can see
the shapes of the equilibrium bidding functions, separately for the low and high types. It can be
observed that for toehold di¤erences greater than 10 percentage points, the functions have parts
with extremely high slopes. For signals close to zero the high types bids rise very steeply and
similarly for signals close to 100 the low types functions are rising very fast.
Observe that the bidder with the large toehold bids for every possible signal more than in the
symmetric case where no bidder has a toehold. On the other hand, the bidder with the smaller
toehold bids lower than in the symmetric case for almost all but the smallest values of her signal.
Finally it is obvious from the gure that when the di¤erence between the toeholds becomes larger,
1This can be seen by the standard methods used in the literature. There is however a more straightforward way
to see what happens for very small toeholds, by taking the limit of the bidding function in proposition 1 with the
toeholds being equal and tending to zero. The function then reduces to just b(t) = 2t:
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Figure 1: The equilibrium bidding functions for i = 0:01 and j = 0:05; 0:2 and 0:5. The lower
thick lines represent the bids of the low toehold type, the upper thin lines are the bids of the high
type.
the high type tends to become more aggressive for all signals he can get. The low type tends to
bid less aggressively for almost all of her possible signals.
Results from the theoretical paper that will be useful for our analysis are
a) the probability of winning the auction for agent i is just i=(i + j)
b) increasing a bidders toehold always makes the bidder more aggressive.
c) increasing a bidders toehold increases her prots regardless of her signal.
3 The experimental setup
The experiments were run with undergraduates of all faculties in the LeeX of the Universitat
Pompeu Fabra, in Barcelona. No subject could participate in more than one session. Upon arrival
students were randomly assigned to their seats. One of the instructors read the instructions aloud
and questions were answered in private. Sessions lasted about 1 hour including the reading of
the instructions. All sessions presented here were run by computer using z-tree tools (Fischbacher
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2007).
Our design consisted of three treatments with two players, one owning a low toehold and the
other owning a high toehold. The low toehold was always equal to 1%, the high toeholds were equal
to 5%, 20% and 50% respectively. We had one session of the combination 1%-5% (hence treatment
1-5), two sessions of 1%-20% (treatment 1-20) and three sessions of 1%-50% (treatment 1-50).
Players alternated roles every turn2 and the assignment of the toeholds was common knowledge.
Note that the treatments we chose are representative of all cases where the toeholds have a ratio
of 1/5, 1/20 and 1/50. This means treatments 1-20 and 1-50 should not be dismissed as extreme
cases that have no practical relevance.3
Each session consisted of 16 subjects, which were divided into 2 independent subgroups of
8 subjects. This way we obtain two independent observations for each session. Each session
consisted of 50 rounds. In each round or period, a signal between 1 and 100 was drawn randomly
and independently for every bidder. Subsequently the players participate in an English auction.
This means they had in their screen a clock that was constantly ticking upwards. Bidders were
considered to be actively bidding until they pressed a key to drop out of the auction. Once they
dropped out, they could not re-enter the auction. As usual in English auctions, when all but one
players have exited the auction stops. Since we had only two players, once one of them dropped
out, the auction ended and the other player was assigned the good. The winner was paid the
common value (sum of the two values of the two players) and had to pay the price shown in the
clock. Additionally every player received her portion of the price according to her toehold. The
information feedback the players received after every round was the value of the asset, the selling
price, whether she was the buyer of the asset or not, the gain/loss that she made if she was the
buyer of the asset or the gain/loss that she made if she was not the buyer of the asset. Players
were given some time to review this information before going to the next round. After every round
subjects were randomly matched with the next opponent.
During the experiment, subjects were always able to check the History of the last six rounds
2We had the players alternate roles because of the big asymmetry induced by the toeholds. Theoretically the low
toehold types were predicted to make close to zero prots in treatments 1-20 and 1-50!
3For the bidding strategies the ratio of the toeholds is of big signicance, but the absolute size of the toeholds
plays a much smaller role. It is easy to see that the predicted bidding functions are virtually identical between the
case of 1-20 and other cases with the same toehold ratio. This includes for example cases that are more frequently
found in the eld, such as toeholds of 0.1% and 2%. The toehold conguration of 1-20 and 1-50 was chosen in order
to make computations easier for the subjects.
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they played, with all the relevant information. The rest of the rounds were viewable by using a
scroll bar.
The currency of the experiment were Thalers. At the outset of the experiment, each of the
subjects received a capital balance of 500 Thalers. Total gain from participating in this experiment
was equal to the sum of all the players gains and her capital balance minus her losses. If ever the
players gains fell below zero, she would not be allowed to participate any more. Fortunately this
did not happen. At the end of the experiment the gains were converted to pesetas at the rate of 2
pesetas per Thaler4. Average earnings were about 18 euros (3000 pesetas), with the lowest payo¤
being about 6 euros (1000 pesetas) and the highest about 30.7 euros (5096 pesetas).
4 Experimental results
The main question we are trying to answer is to what extent owning a toehold alters the strategic
behavior of a bidder in an English auction. Then we want to see if this change in behavior is
translated into a di¤erence in prices.
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Figure 2: Actual (thick lines) vs theoretical bid functions (thin lines) in the three treatments. The
dotted lines represent bids of the low type, solid lines are bids of the high type.
We start with the strategies. In Figure 2 we have plotted the average exits for the three
treatments for given signals5. Furthermore, we plot the equilibrium bids of all players. Clearly for
the treatment 1-5 there seems to be no di¤erence in behavior between the two types. For treatments
4The peseta has meanwhile given its place to the euro. One euro corresponds to approximately 166 pesetas.
5For graphs with details for every individual experiment see Appendix.
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should win won
Treatment 1-5 0.167 0.51
Treatment 1-20 0.038 0.451
Treatment 1-50 0:0158 0:3375
Table 1: Win Frequency of the low type in the auction: Theoretic vs Actual
1-20 and 1-50 high types bid more than low types. Players in general do not follow the shape of
the equilibrium bidding functions ie, bidding seems to be linear instead of the highly convex and
concave shapes of the equilibrium bids.
Players do not even seem to be inuenced by the toehold, when it is low, as can be seen
from the fact that in Treatment 1-5 the low toehold type wins approximately half the time, when
theoretically she should win only 17% of the time. These results are presented in Table 1. Note
that although the signals were drawn at random, the theoretical ex post winning possibilities are
close to the ex ante ones6 of 1/6 for treatment 1-5, 1/21 for 1-20 and 1/51 for treatment 1-50. In
treatment 1-20 the low toehold type still wins more often than she should, and the discrepancy
between the theoretical frequency and the predicted one is slightly bigger. In treatment 1-50 the
discrepancy between the theoretical winning frequency and the empirical one is smaller. However
it has to be noted that the low type should win only about 1.5% of the time, while actually she
won in 33.8% of the cases!
In total, there seems to be a tendency for the low toehold type to win less often, the higher the
toehold of her opponent. This means naturally that a higher toehold, brings a higher chance of
winning, both theoretically and in the experiments. However this e¤ect of the toehold on bidding
behavior is not very clear, so we try to estimate its statistical signicance. Note, that it is an
inherent characteristic of an English auction that we cannot observe the intended bids of the
winners, as the winner exits the auction automatically once the one but last bidder leaves. To
overcome this we use tobit techniques, or censored regressions (see Kirchkamp, Moldovanu 2004)
to estimate these unobserved bids. The regression we estimated was
Bid = constant + *value + *toehold+"
We run this regression for each independent observation. Note the toehold variable is not a
binary dummy, but equals the value of the toehold (1, 5, 20 or 50). We add a dummy for the
6Recall from section 2 that the ex ante probability of player i winning is i=(i + j):
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period variable, to control for learning e¤ects. There seemed to be some learning in the rst 5 to 10
periods.7 We always excluded these rst 10 periods from the subsequent analysis. Other factors we
tried in the analysis, like cubic or interaction terms were not signicant and thus are not presented.
The results of the regressions for the various treatments are summarized in Table 2.
Treatment constant value toehold mean R2
1-5 55.876 1.08 0.74 0.67
 3.82 0.06 0.79
(2/2) (2/2) (1*/2)
1-20 49.53 0.84 0.365 0.51
 4.15 0.07 0.19
(4/4) (4/4) (2**/4)
1-50 43.92 0.887 0.51 0.60
 3.88 0.068 0.08
(6/6) (6/6) (6***/6)
Table 2: Results of the tobit regressions. There was one regression for each independent session.
Numbers in parentheses are signicant cases out of total. In treatment 1-5 the one asterisk means
that one observation was signicant at the 0.1 level. In 1-20 there were two signicant observations,
both at 0.05. In 1-50 all cases were signicant at the 0.01 level.
In parentheses is the number of observations where the coe¢cient was signicant and the as-
terisks denote the level of signicance.8 Note that the toehold dummy is equal to 5, 20 and 50
in the relevant cases. We observe that in treatment 1-5 the possession of a higher toehold makes
almost no di¤erence for the subjects bidding behavior. However, in 1-20 the toehold sometimes
has a signicant e¤ect. On average, the high toehold type bid 0.365*(20-1)=6.94 more than the
low toehold type. In 1-50 the e¤ect of the toehold is always signicant and quite high. The high
toehold type will bid on average 24.99 more than the low toehold type.
Now, for economic applications it is interesting to see how this di¤erence in the bidding behavior
translates into auction prices. If the di¤erent bidding behavior were to result in similar prices as
theoretically predicted, then our results would show that the theory is valid for all practical purposes
7The way it was done was by adding a dummy for the rst periods 0-5 and 5-10 and testing for its signicance.
8By independent observation we mean the subset of 8 subjects in every session that was playing independently
of any other participants in this or another session. The number of observations with signicant coe¢cients refers to
how many of these regressions yielded signicant parameters. The coe¢cients presented in the table are the averages
over all independent observations.
Our method might seem unorthodox but we have two reasons. First, we cannot pool the 1% toeholds from di¤erent
treatments, because they are actually predicted to bid di¤erent and they do. We can also not pool the 5%, 20% and
50% cases. This means we need a regression for every treatment. But even in a single treatment, there was some
heterogeneity, learning for example took longer in some cases, and bidding was sometimes slightly di¤erent. In order
not to mask these di¤erences (especially since we are running censored regressions), we think it is wiser just to run
separate regressions.
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where the prices are the point of interest. As we can see in Figure 3 this is not the case.
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Figure 3: Predicted and actual prices over time in the three treatments.
The unique equilibrium predicts9 prices should fall slightly with the high type getting a toehold
20 instead of 5. This is reected in our data. The mean price in treatment 1-5 was 89.7, in treatment
1-20 it was much lower at 73.8. Going from a high type with toehold 20 to the high type having
50, the prices were expected to rise by more than 10%, but they only rose to 76.9 which is a 4.2%
rise. In general our results mean that ceteris paribus the sellers revenues will tend to fall when
there exist players with larger toeholds.
Interestingly the deviation of actual prices from the theoretical ones tends to fall the higher the
toehold. The mean deviation over all periods was 28 Thalers for treatment 1-5, 14 for treatment
1-20 and 8 for treatment 1-50. Note of course that when calculating the mean, positive and negative
9The a priori expected price is
j(2j+i+1)
(j+1)(2j+i)
+
i(2i+j+1)
(i+1)(2i+j)
; which gives us 63.1, 62.8 and 69.2 for treatments
1-5, 1-20 and 1-50 respectively. For our purposes however we use the theoretical prices given the actual values that
the players had, so there is a small di¤erence.
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Treatment Period 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50
1-5 theory 62.44 60.08 68.35 51.57 62.99
actual 75.94 84.98 96.3 82.69 89.12
1-20 theory 60.41 58.36 64.77 60.8 57.7
actual 51.44 68.23 76.23 74.82 73.5
1-50 theory 69.14 69.39 69.04 67.81 69.78
actual 66.52 75.68 74.63 74.62 80.15
Table 3: Predicted and actual prices over time, in blocks of 10 periods, in the three treatments.
deviations tend to cancel out. This is why it seems useful to have a look at Figure 4, where we
present the evolution of the deviation of observed prices from the equilibrium prices, over time and
for the di¤erent treatments.
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Figure 4: Deviation in average prices (actual minus predicted) over time for the three treatments.
The deviation in prices seems to be highest in treatment 1-5, where prices were usually quite
a bit higher than predicted by the theory. This is due to the fact that the low types bid more
aggressively than they should. In treatments 1-20 and 1-50 the deviation becomes smaller, with a
tendency for the deviation to be higher in treatment 1-20. This again can be explained by the fact
that low toehold bidders in treatment 1-20 were a bit more aggressive. Table 4 summarizes these
results.
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Treatment Mean actual price Mean predicted price Mean deviation
1-5 88.7 61 27.7
1-20 73.8 60.3 13.5
1-50 76.9 69.2 7.7
Table 4: Mean prices and deviations from the theoretical predictions, in the various treatments
4.1 Theoretical analysis
As we have seen in Figure 2, the subjects behavior constitutes a deviation with respect to the
equilibrium prediction. Does this deviation evade any systematic rational analysis or are subjects
responding to a feature of the game that was not obvious from the previous theoretical analysis?
Our paper claims that the latter is the case.
There is some literature showing that we should not expect subjects to play the equilibrium
strategies if a deviation from these does not cost very much (Harrison 1989). Players will make
some small errors when bidding, which produces noise and this noise will be in some way indirectly
proportional to the cost of a deviation (see for example McKelvey, Palfrey 1995). To examine this,
we will calculate the equilibrium expected payo¤ functions for each type in every treatment. To
be precise, the equilibrium expected payo¤ functions are the functions which depict one players
expected payo¤ depending on her bid. The expectation is taken over all possible signals of the
opponent, given that this opponent will play the strategy predicted by the Nash equilibrium in
Section 2.
A closer look at these functions in our experiments, reveals that payo¤s are very at around the
maximum. This means that a player anticipating the others to be in equilibrium, will not expect
a big punishment for deviating from his equilibrium bid. Figure 5 visualizes the concept. The
di¤erent lines in each of the graphs in gure 5 are drawn for selected signals (0, 25, 50, 75, 100) of
a player with toehold 1 (graphs on the left) and those of a player with a high toehold (graphs on
the right). The x-axis depicts a players bid and the y-axis the expected payo¤ given the behavior
of the other type, and given the private signal (0, 25, ... ,100). As we can see for the low toehold
type the expected payo¤ is near 0 in treatments 1-20 and 1-50 as theoretically the low type never
wins. Additionally this atness is growing with the di¤erence in the toehold sizes10. This means
10Recall here that as explained in the design, our treatments are representative of a much wider class of possible
congurations. This means that payo¤s are at not only in 1-20 and 1-50 but in all cases where the toehold ratio is
greater than 20.
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the punishment for deviations is smallest in treatment 1-50, where it makes virtually no di¤erence
for the high toehold type if she bids even 50% less than the theoretical best response.
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Figure 5: Payo¤ atness in the various treatments. The various curves depict expected prots
depending on bids (both scaled by 100) for signals 0, 25, 50, 75 and 100 given that the opponents
play their equilibrium strategies.
The atness we observe in the payo¤s is a general and fundamental weakness of all the equilibria
in auction models where parts of the bidding function are very steep. The intuitive explanation is
that in these explosive equilibria predicted by theory, the low types bid very defensively up to a
very steep last part. In treatment 1-50 the low type bids less than 140 for almost all signals he gets.
This means the high type has no big incentive to bid more than this value, as the probability of
winning remains virtually unchanged. Thus, the at payo¤s with their associated weak incentives
for equilibrium play help to explain the di¤erence between the results in our experiments and the
usual results in common value English auctions, where bidders tend to follow their equilibrium
strategies more closely. In common value English auctions, payo¤s are not at and the payo¤ max-
ima are quite pronounced. Thus bidders get stronger incentives to play the equilibrium strategies.
In explosive equilibria of the type presented here, this is not the case.
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Now, given the atness of the payo¤ functions it is interesting to investigate, how big was the
deviation of our subjects in the payo¤ space11? The reason is that although bid di¤erences might
be signicant, they could lead to insignicant di¤erences in payo¤s, which is what really motivates
subjects. Figure 6 illustrates the di¤erence between actual and theoretical payo¤s in all treatments.
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Figure 6: Actual vs Theoretical payo¤s. The straight lines describe the equilibrium relationship.
If subjects payo¤s were close to the equilibrium payo¤s all dots should lie close to the 45 degree
line. We see however that this is not the case (see also table 5 for average prots). Only in some
observations in Treatment 1-20 and in almost all observations in treatment 1-50 are the payo¤s of
the high type close to equilibrium. The payo¤s of the low type are very often away from equilibrium.
This is due to the fact that in Treatments 1-20 and 1-50 the low type sometimes wins the auction,
although, as we have seen in table 1, theoretically she should virtually never win!
The analysis suggests that the bidders in our experiment had no incentives to play the equi-
librium strategy. But their behavior is not completely irrational. Instead of playing the Nash
11According to many authors (eg Harrisson 91) this is the naturally relevant space to study.
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Treatment Prots (all cases) Prots (conditional on winning)
Strong Weak Strong Weak
actual theory actual theory actual theory actual theory
1-5 11.23 35.02 5.88 5.63 14.33 42.62 6.23 26.97
1-20 30.32 48.49 12.27 1.15 43.3 50.07 26.39 14.84
1-50 55.01 64.63 7.44 0.9 62 64.92 21.14 5.31
Table 5: Actual and theoretical prots, in the various treatments
prediction, the subjects strategies were in many cases closer to a best response12 to the actual
bidding behavior of the others in treatments 1-5 and 1-20, at least qualitatively as we can see
in Figure 7. The low toehold types bid more than predicted and the high types less, thus they
converge to a middle ground.
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Figure 7: Best responses to actual bidding behaviour of the opponents. The dashed lines represent
the bids of the low type type, solid lines represent the bids of the high type. The thin lines depict
the equilibrium best responses, while the thicker lines depict the best responses to the actual bid
distributions.
It is worth noting that the best responses given actual behavior are not very di¤erent between
the low and the high type in the rst two treatments and even the inter treatment di¤erence is not
12We get the best responses by calculating the expected payo¤ given actual bids, and then maximising it. Actually,
we calculated the average payo¤ for each bid in the sample when matched up with every other bid and signal value
in the distribution, including that players other bids.
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high. Only in treatment 1-50 do we have a clear separation of the two types. Note that unlike in
Rose and Kagel (2006), the high type would not have made a much higher prot in expectation, had
he chosen the equilibrium bids instead of the actual ones. This is due to the substantial overbidding
of the low types, which makes the option of winning less attractive to the high type than predicted
by the equilibrium.
We also observe that the expected payo¤ functions are not so at, if we calculate them this
time assuming that the opponents strategies follow the actual empirical distribution of the bids.
This means that subjects now have higher incentives to play strategies that resemble their best
responses. This is visualized in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Payo¤ functions given the actual behaviour in the various treatments. The various curves
depict expected prots depending on bids (both scaled by 100) for signals 0, 25, 50, 75 and 100.
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4.1.1 Bounded rationality
As the shape of the payo¤ functions is leading to deviations from equilibrium, one could use an
equilibrium concept that incorporates the ideas of subjects being inuenced by the exact shape of
payo¤ functions. In particular, we could calculate a quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and
Palfrey 1995), where players put weights on their strategies that are proportional in some way to
the expected payo¤ from each action. Unfortunately the calculation of a QRE in auctions with
continuous strategy spaces is to date generically impossible. An approximation using a discrete
version of the game with a 10x10 bidding space, shows that the QRE would go in the direction we
observed.
Given that payo¤s are very at, any kind of learning model would predict very slow convergence
to the equilibrium. So instead of an equilibrium concept it is interesting to use an explanation that
assumes bounded rationality and does not expect subjects to reach an equilibrium, such as a levels
of reasoning model (see Nagel 1995, Stahl and Wilson 1995, Camerer 2004, Crawford and Iriberri
2008). Suppose there exist some Level 0 players who are completely irrational and play randomly.
Then the expected payo¤ of a Level 1 (L1) player who anticipates this behavior is:
i(bi) = Prfbi > bjgE[ti + tj   (1  i)pjbi > bj ] + Prfbi  bjgE[ipjbi  bj ]
Since Level 0 bids randomly with a uniform distribution
i(bi) = 0:5bi[ti + 0:5  0:5(1  i)bi] + (1  0:5bi)ibi
Maximization for a Level 1 player leads to following best response bidding function:
bL1(t; ) =
1
1+i
ti +
0: 5+2i
1+i
Note that for a toehold of zero, L1 means the player bids the expectation of the other types
signal (0.5) plus her own signal, that is just her expectation for the total value of the company. As
toeholds become bigger the constant part of the bidding function rises above 0.5 and the slope falls.
Another interesting feature is that for L1 players the size of the opponents toehold is irrelevant.
This is quite intuitive as L1 players do not follow the chain of reasoning that leads to a Nash
equilibrium, where bids are usually dependent on the best responses of the others (except if there
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Figure 9: Levels of reasoning: actual behaviour vs the Nash prediction and the Level 1 and 2
models.
exists a dominant strategy). In Figure 9 we observe that L1 ts our experimental results rather well
in treatment 1-5, much better than the Nash prediction. For treatments 1-20 and 1-50, recall that
the bids of the winner are censored. As the high type tends to win more often in these treatments
the observed exits tend to be more downwardly biased than the underlying bidding strategy. If
instead of the observed exits we use the results of the censored regression from table 2, L1 describes
the high types strategies better than the Nash prediction.
What is missing however is an explanation of the fact that some low toehold types tended to
bid a bit less aggressively in treatment 1-50 and 1-20 than in 1-5. Such an e¤ect can be explained
when we examine the bidding strategy of level 2 players, who best respond to the bidding strategies
of L1. The calculation of these strategies is not so simple as above and Level 2 players do not use
a linear strategy like L1. However, as expected, they do respond to the L1 players in a way that
makes low toehold types bid less the higher the toehold of their opponent.
We t the levels of reasoning model to the data, assuming that the population consists of a
mixture of L1 and L2 types, as is found in most experiments in the literature. The model has
two parameters, the frequency of the L1 types which is  and the SD of the normally distributed
errors  which we assume is equal for both types13. We also t the unique Nash equilibrium model
13 In the presented estimations we forced the individual mixture of levels to be equal to the overall frequency in the
population for the same type in the same treatment. We have done calculation with individual estimation of the level
and the t was not enhanced by much, but the number of free parameters grows by the number of subjects. Thus
we preferred the more parsimonious model. However it is of interest that the type frequencies found with individual
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assuming normally distributed errors with a SD of : A comparison of the models follows in table
6.
1-5 5-1 1-20 20-1 1-50 50-1
Nash -LL 798.87 864.32 1744.0 1581.1 2999.8 1734.3
 44.81 42.8 32.91 62.11 26.07 55.56
mixed L1+L2 -LL 709.08 758.49 1742.2 1437.5 3125.5 1610.5
 24.92 22.71 32.74 37.52 31.72 37.67
 0.9316 0.9781 1 0.8591 1 0
Table 6: Maximized log likelihoods for the Nash and LOR models.
Overall the mixed L1+L2 model performs better than the Nash prediction and the estimation
of the mixture parameter  is similar across types and treatments.14 A serious outlier is found in
the case of toehold 50 in treatment 1-50. We think the explanation is to be found within the fact
that this case su¤ers most from the aforementioned unobservable nal bid problem.
4.2 Does a toehold grant its holder a real advantage?
We can now answer the question if a toehold is benecial for its holder, at least to the extent that
real life situations will resemble results in the lab. There are two ways to view this, from the ex
ante or from the ex post viewpoint.
In the interim stage, where the company has bought the toehold and is preparing for the
acquisition, all the investment the company initially made to buy the toehold is a sunk cost. So
the only important questions is: does a toehold raise my chances to win in the auction? Does the
expected price fall? As we have seen, the answer is positive in both cases. The bidding in the
various experiments depends on the size of the available toeholds. Although the high toehold type
does not always win (especially not in treatment 1-5), the auction prices fall monotonically in the
size of the high types toehold. This means the presence of a bidder with a high toehold benets
both bidders, usually asymmetrically, and lowers the revenue that the seller can expect. The choice
of what toehold to have is fairly clear cut. As can be seen in Figure 10, the bidders with a toehold
of 50 fared better than the others for almost any private value they had.
estimation where quite close to previous results at ca. 0.05 for L0, 0.6 for L1 and 0.35 for L2.
14The two models are not nested, so a likelihood ratio test cannot be performed. We have calculated the Bayesian
Information Criterion that punishes models that have more variables. Still, as the di¤erence in the number of
parameters is just one, the BIC yields the same ranking of the models.
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Figure 10: Average prots of holders of toeholds 5 (low curve), 20 and 50 (highest curve) in our
experiments for di¤erent signals.
A rational agent will usually regard the toehold acquisition question from the ex ante viewpoint.
Should a company invest capital and time to acquire a toehold, or should it opt directly for a full
blown takeover o¤er? The ex ante case is more interesting but also more complicated. In particular,
it is not generally known under what conditions the bidder acquired the toehold in the rst case.
Let us start the analysis by assuming a fair price, that is the price per share paid by the prospective
owner of the toehold was reecting the true value of the company15, so that for example a 50%
toehold of a company of value 100 would have cost exactly 50. Assume additionally that each
bidder got a signal of 50. Then we nd that buying this toehold of 50% was a wise choice for this
bidder in case he wins the auction as he gets the rest of the company for a low price of around 40
(as we can see in Figure 2, the weak type bids around 80 which determines a price of 40 for the
50% of the company that the strong type does not already own), but a suboptimal choice in case
he loses, as he would just get 40 for his share of the company, leaving him with a loss of 10.
In general given the actual behavior of subjects in our experiments we can calculate the expected
prot for a bidder with a signal X if he buys a toehold of 5, 20 or 50 and given that the other
15Suppose that shares of the object under sale were oated in nancial markets. Then some informed nancial
investors could buy shares in the market in order to resell them to the strategic buyers who are interested in acquiring
control of the company. In such a process the market price can reect the true value of the company, or the share can
be over/undervalued, depending on market conditions and the information of the nancial investors. For a detailed
analysis of such a model see Georganas and Zaehringer (2008).
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bidder has a toehold of 1%. The results are depicted in Figure 11. The di¤erence between the ex
ante and ex post cases is just the inclusion of the payment for the toehold16.
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Figure 11: Average prots of bidders holding a toehold of 5, 20 and 50, including the expenditure
to acquire the toehold, calculated with method 1 (see text).
The results are now reversed. Acquiring a toehold of 50 is almost never a protable strategy.
For low signals all toeholds are similarly appealing, but for signals higher than 50 a toehold of 20
is always the best choice.
In this same setup we can now relax the assumption of a fair company valuation. Suppose the
company is undervalued, meaning that the acquisition of a toehold will cost less than its fair value.
In real markets this should be the most common case, at least in the eyes of the acquirer, since
many takeover attempts are initiated when the acquirer thinks the target is undervalued. The high
toehold -50- becomes more attractive in this case. For companies who receive a low signal, 50 is the
optimal choice, while for high signals a toehold of 20 is the optimal choice. The more strongly the
target is undervalued, the more the bidders decision problem resembles the ex post case, presented
in the previous gure. That is, with strong undervaluation a toehold of 50 is the best choice for
most signals.
16We calculated these expected payo¤s assuming that the signal of the other bidder is unknown. Thus we just
take its expectation which is equal to 50. It it is of course conceivable that a bidder knows the signal of the other
bidder (or has an estimate thereof), but this would completely change the game.
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On the other hand, when the target companys share in the stockmarket is signicantly over-
valued, a low toehold of ve per cent is the optimal choice given any signal. A heavily overvalued
share price actually lowers expected payo¤s to such a degree, that buying no toehold at all is the
best strategy for low signal types.
A di¤erent setup is also possible. Imagine the players acquire the toeholds before the private
signals are drawn. The player does not know his own private signal and thus the only information
available is the expected value of the company, which equals 100. Then a 5% toehold would cost
exactly 5, a 20% would cost 20 and a 50% toehold would cost 50. Since bidders cannot condition
on their (unknown) signals, they can only calculate their expected payo¤s over all possible signals.
Toehold 20 is the most protable, with an expected prot of around 25, while toehold 5 yields a
slightly lower payo¤ of around 22 and toehold 50 a still lower payo¤ of about 15. Note that for low
realizations of the signal, the bidder will actually have negative expected prots if she acquires any
toehold.
Summarizing, while the exact setup of a toehold acquisition can vary according to the informa-
tion background of the bidders and the conditions in the stockmarket, we conclude that acquiring a
high toehold can often be too costly and thus an unappealing choice for a company contemplating
a takeover.
4.3 Toeholds and almost common values
Almost common values can be seen as a limit case of the more general toehold framework. In an
almost common value auction all but one bidders have the same common value, that is they possess
a toehold of zero. The last person has an advantage over the common value, that is, a positive
toehold. As the probability of winning in the two person toehold game is equal to i=(i + j) in
the limiting case of almost common values the strong type is in an extremely advantaged position
and wins with probability one.
The size of the private advantage of the strong type, that is the size of his toehold, does
not inuence her probability of winning theoretically. However Rose and Kagel (2008) nd that
bidders do not follow the strategies predicted by the explosive equilibrium. The authors nd that
advantaged bidders won only 27% of the auctions, where 25% would be predicted by chance factors
alone. Additionally there was no signicant change in average revenue compared to a series of pure
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common value English auctions.
Combining our results with these ndings leads to the following hypothesis: the explosive
equilibria are not to be found in real markets. At and close to these equilibria, payo¤s are extremely
at, which means subjects have no pressure to play the predicted strategies. Instead they seem to
be playing a naive linear strategy. The explanation of Rose and Kagel that the strong type just
adds her private advantage to her signal and proceeds to bid like in a pure common value auction,
seems to be a plausible rst explanation and it works similarly to our L1 model. There is however
a feature that remains unexamined: how is the low type playing, how does the low type respond to
a variation in the high types private advantage? We claim the low type will bid lower the higher
the toehold of the opponent. This is not predicted by the RK model and could not be explained
if weak players were only L1 types in the sense of the LOR model. It is however a prediction for
L2 types, which exist in the population as we -and other studies- have found. Thus, we can make
a testable prediction for almost common value auctions. The winning probability of the high type
should not be independent of her private advantage as predicted by theory. This is the case because
as Rose and Kagel predict, the high type will be more aggressive but critically the probability will
also rise because the low type as in our experiments will become less aggressive in his bidding
behavior. This e¤ect however does not converge to the explosive bidding as predicted due to the
at payo¤s which mean that subjects do not have su¢cient monetary incentives to follow such a
counterintuitive strategy. A further factor explaining the lack of convergence to explosive bidding
can be the fact that players do not think past a limited number of levels of reasoning.
5 Conclusions
We have found that higher toeholds do raise the probability of winning and the prots of their
owners. Moreover the sellers revenue tends to fall the higher the discrepancy between the two
players toeholds. However, this fall is not linear, which means that the revenues fall faster when
the toeholds are small than when they are greater. We additionally nd that these results are not
as strong as predicted by theory, although they are broadly in the right direction. Importantly,
we show that the high deviations from equilibrium bids are not reected in high di¤erences of
payo¤s between actual and equilibrium payo¤s, which could thus be an explanation of the subjects
24
behavior. Our results have some implications for the seller. When one player has a toehold, it
might be of benet to the seller to award the other buyer some shares to level the playing eld.
In general we conclude that small toeholds are not very e¤ective when we observe real human
players, in contrast to the theory which predicts a very high e¤ect of even the smallest toeholds.
On the other hand, we have seen that big toeholds give their owners a signicant advantage in the
laboratory. Our result is in support of the empirical literature (e.g. Betton and Eckbo 2000) which
nds acquiring companies owning sometimes quite large toeholds. This observation is contrary to
the theory which predicts a small advantage would do as well and contrary to the strategic thought
which says potential buyers should avoid signalling their intentions by prematurely buying too big
shares of the company. Finally, although we nd big toeholds to be e¤ective, we show that, under
some circumstances, acquiring such large toeholds might be too costly and their cost might not be
justied by the advantage one gets in the subsequent bidding for the control of the company.
6 Appendix
In this appendix we present the graphs for the individual independent observations. Recall every
session was divided in two independent groups, which are thus independent observations.
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